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An Emerging Rule of Reason in Voting Rights Law* 
SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF† 
For the first time in at least a generation, the central focus of voting rights law has 
returned to the issue of eligibility to cast a ballot and the act of voting itself. Unlike 
in prior generations, the fights over voting are centrally part of a partisan battle for 
electoral supremacy and are not organized around perpetuating the historic sub-
ordination of minority populations—whatever the localized impact on minorities that 
the new voting rules may trigger. In the partisan environment, courts face claims of 
exclusion that only imperfectly map onto constitutional prohibitions of discrimina-
tory intent or statutory protections of minority voting opportunity. Although only 
some of these challenges arise in jurisdictions that were formerly covered by Section 
5 of the Voting Rights Act, the Supreme Court’s ruling in Shelby County further 
compels a new legal approach to these cases. 
This Article begins with the observation that, at least thus far, courts have been 
remarkably sympathetic to these new claims of voter exclusion, even without precise 
doctrinal categories for assessing them. Courts have fashioned parallel lines of case 
authority under the Constitution and the Voting Rights Act to shift evidentiary bur-
dens to defendants to justify the need for election law overhaul shown to have an 
impact on the availability of the franchise. Voting rights law is moving from a rigid 
per se rule against certain established practices to a contextual assessment of the 
reason for the challenged practices. The Article presents this evolution as analogous 
to the emergence of a rule of reason to provide nuance to the overly rigid antitrust 
laws under the Sherman Act. Any such contextual approach needs an animating 
principle to guide a flexible judicial standard. In the antitrust context, that was the 
idea of consumer welfare. The question in the voting rights context is whether a 
corresponding notion of voter welfare can emerge.  
I. CONCEPTUALIZING A RULE OF REASON  
The resurgence of legal challenge to voter registration and poll access restrictions 
has placed voting rights law in a quandary. For much of the period since the legal 
overhaul of the right to vote in the 1960s, expanded access to the ballot was sub-
sumed within the struggle for the minority franchise. Doctrinally, this meant that the 
central thrust in expanding the franchise fell under the Voting Rights Act (VRA) in 
general and more particularly under the geographically and historically targeted 
prohibitions of Section 5 of the Act. That legal approach suffered a double blow with 
the Supreme Court’s invalidation of the trigger formula for Section 5 coverage in 
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Shelby County,1 and then with the transformation of voter access and the accompany-
ing claims of voter fraud into a frontline in partisan struggles across the country.2  
It is of course possible to lament the passing of a simpler legal regime or to try to 
force altered realities into the mold of conflicts past. One can examine the number of 
lawsuits filed in different jurisdictions under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act,3 or 
the extent of racially polarized voting in presidential elections in various parts of the 
country,4 or surveys bearing on racial attitudes,5 or even the number of Google 
searches that might betray racial animosity.6 But even if the methodologies of all 
these inquiries were accepted at face value,7 there is still the troubling fact that layer-
ing proxies on proxies makes the legal issues less clear and increases both judicial 
reluctance to engage the problem and the accompanying risk of error.  
Under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, the focus on racially polarized voting 
                                                                                                                 
 
 1. Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013). 
 2. This is by now well-trod territory. For my own contributions, see Samuel Issacharoff, 
Ballot Bedlam, 64 DUKE L.J. 1363 (2015) [hereinafter Issacharoff, Ballot Bedlam]; Samuel 
Issacharoff, Beyond the Discrimination Model on Voting, 127 HARV. L. REV. 95 (2013). 
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Variation and Political Participation Through the Lens of Section 2, in VOTING RIGHTS ACT 
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vant portion of successful claims). 
 4. Katz, supra note 3, 195–97; Ellen Katz, Margaret Aisenbrey, Anna Baldwin, Emma 
Cheuse & Anna Weisbrodt, Documenting Discrimination in Voting: Judicial Findings Under 
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 5. Christopher S. Elmendorf & Douglas M. Spencer, Administering Section 2 of the 
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to fill the post-Shelby void); Christopher S. Elmendorf & Douglas M. Spencer, The Geography 
of Racial Stereotyping: Evidence and Implications for VRA Preclearance After Shelby 
County, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 1123, 1139–60 (2014) (proposing the use of survey data 
demonstrating negative racial stereotyping and correlating to actual voting behavior as the 
basis for new Section 5 preclearance criteria, and showing that such criteria largely correspond 
to the former coverage map). But see Stephen Ansolabehere, Nathaniel Persily & Charles 
Stewart III, Race, Region, and Vote Choice in the 2008 Election: Implications for the Future 
of the Voting Rights Act, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1385, 1413–36 (2010) (relying on survey data to 
conclude that ideological preferences explained differences in voting patterns among white 
voters in covered and noncovered states during the 2004 election but that ideology failed to 
do so during the 2008 election when Obama was the Democratic nominee); Stephen 
Ansolabehere, Nathaniel Persily & Charles Stewart III, Regional Differences in Racial 
Polarization in the 2012 Presidential Election: Implications for the Constitutionality of 
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 126 HARV. L. REV. FORUM 205, 215–20 (2013) (showing 
that racially polarized voting was more pronounced in Section 5 covered states than in 
noncovered states during the 2012 presidential election). 
 6. Chris Elmendorf, Googling the Future of the Voting Rights Act, JURIST: ACAD. 
COMMENT. (June 29, 2012, 2:30 PM), http://www.jurist.org/forum/2012/06/christopher 
-elmendorf-voting-future.php [https://perma.cc/7H2G-SZ2Y]. 
 7. But see, e.g., Adam B. Cox & Thomas J. Miles, Judging the Voting Rights Act, 108 
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 9–13 (2008) (critiquing the methodology of the Katz study on Section 2 
litigation, Katz et al., supra note 4). 
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had the advantage of being operationally tied in to the dispositive legal issue whether 
the use of at-large or multimember electoral districts denied minority voters an 
appropriate chance to elect candidates of choice to office. By contrast, the prevalence 
of discriminatory survey responses or racially combative internet searches in a 
particular jurisdiction may inform policy makers as to what should be matters of 
concern or, more likely, may shape the forms of political competition in those 
jurisdictions. But is the revealed preference for certain kinds of internet sites tractable 
enough for courts to use as a guide for how an electoral system should be structured? 
Would the intriguing potential overlay between the searches conducted from the 
anonymous privacy of a home computer and the equally anonymous casting of a 
ballot condemn all election results, or any minority electoral losses? Perhaps. But 
more likely the increased conceptual gap between voting and proxies for racial views 
would strain the willingness of courts to ascribe discriminatory motive quite so 
amply.  
Instead of searching for proxies near and far, it is perhaps time to rethink the entire 
judicial approach to the problem of guaranteeing the basic rights to the franchise. 
The chief problem is the constricted set of dichotomous choices available to courts 
under historic legal approaches. Either the voting restriction is defined by race, in 
purpose or effect, or it is not. If it is, then either constitutionally or statutorily, the 
question is whether it can withstand withering scrutiny as compelled by 
extraordinary state objectives, or whether it must fall. For a body of law developed 
out of responses to decades of formal exclusion of southern blacks under Jim Crow, 
the centrality of race and the presumption of illegitimacy served well to usher in the 
voting rights transformations of the past half century.  
If we accept that the issues of voter access have spread beyond the South, and if 
we further accept that the issues of race are intertwined with partisanship and an 
increasingly polarized political arena, the question is how to approach ballot re-
strictions that draw on mixed considerations that may be proper under some circum-
stances, but not others. What happens when we move from the domain of the 
impermissible under all circumstances to that of the improper under certain circum-
stances? Put in regulatory terms, what happens when the fixed rules of one era do 
not correspond to the needs for more nuanced standards? In turn, are there judicial 
tools available to fill the gap when one statutory regime has ended and a hamstrung 
Congress is unlikely to step into the breach? 
To formalize this inquiry, we can turn to a wildly distinct area of law that was also 
forged in the simple language of prohibition but had to assume more nuanced 
characteristics over time. The analogy is to antitrust law and the rigid “per se” 
prohibitions under Section 1 of the Sherman Act. As with the Voting Rights Act’s 
focus on discriminatory devices in southern voter-eligibility rules, the Sherman Act 
also had a clear target. The law was aimed at breaking up the massive trusts that 
emerged during the industrial transformation of the United States following the Civil 
War. Its language admitted of no nuance, banning “[e]very contract, combination in 
the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade.”8 The searing 
prohibitory language together with both criminal and civil enforcement tools allowed 
the statute broad reach against the sugar, petroleum, and other notorious trusts of its 
                                                                                                                 
 
 8. Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012). 
302 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL  [Vol. 92:299 
 
day. Further, the breadth of the Act was coupled with broad-scale criminal liability, 
such that “[e]very person who shall make any contract or engage in any combination 
or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a felony.”9 
But the reach and power of the Sherman Act also led to the need for judicial 
modification. By its terms, any contract that restrained trade fell under its prohibition. 
In extreme form, that meant that any futures option, any output contract, any 
exclusive-dealing arrangement, and perhaps any open terms in a relational contract 
could be deemed a restraint of trade. No industrial society operates on the basis of an 
endless stream of spot markets. Firms need to hedge their needs in order to make 
long-term investments and do so through contractual arrangements that insulate them 
from the vagaries of the market. Every contract that precommits to future supply or 
demand necessarily acts as a restraint of trade of the contracting parties and, by exten-
sion, of anyone who might seek to contract with them prospectively. If a car owner 
promises to sell to a purchaser in six months at a fixed price, both buyer and seller 
have “combined” to “restrain” future trading options. As the Court recognized in 
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, the statutory language standing alone could “em-
brace every conceivable contract or combination.”10 
Three leading Supreme Court cases sought to restrain the potential statutory 
overreach risked by a literal account of the Sherman Act. In both Standard Oil and 
United States v. American Tobacco Co., the Court began to speak of what the latter 
would term a “reasonable construction” of the statute.11 Subsequently, in Chicago 
Board of Trade v. United States, the Court expanded its rule-of-reason inquiry to 
draw upon a broad composite weighing of the amount of competitive harm, the bene-
fits achieved by an agreement, and the purpose behind the agreement.12 This early 
balancing inquiry had elements now associated with Mathews v. Eldridge13 due 
process balancing, or even modern proportionality inquiries in public law, although 
its early incarnation seemed a laundry list of factors thrown together from numerous 
specific case situations. 
As with any balancing test, the early rule-of-reason cases risked incoherence 
without some firm grounding in the overall statutory objectives. The allure of a sup-
ple balancing test in theory was difficult to manage in practice, yielding “a very open, 
fact-intensive, and seemingly unstructured inquiry.”14 I return here to my first guide 
to antitrust law, then-Professor Robert Bork: “Antitrust policy cannot be made ra-
tional until we are able to give a firm answer to one question: What is the point of 
the law—what are its goals? Everything else follows from the answer we give.”15 
For Bork, and the early Chicago school of antitrust, this meant a substantive commit-
ment to consumer welfare as a means of reining in an otherwise unbounded statutory 
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 10. 221 U.S. 1, 60 (1911). 
 11. United States v. Am. Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 178–81 (1911); Standard Oil, 221 
U.S. at 59–62. 
 12. 246 U.S. 231, 240–41 (1918). 
 13. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
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 15. ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 50 (Free Press 1993). 
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inquiry. As expressed by the emerging case law, the concern was the protection of 
consumers, not rival competitors.16 
A second development in antitrust law is also instructive, this one in the more 
classic prohibition on conspiracies in restraint of trade. Like prohibitions on overt 
racial discrimination, an actual conspiracy in restraint of trade remains the heart of 
the antitrust concern. As market actors become more sophisticated and better coun-
seled, the days of transparent coordination recede, much the same way that state ac-
tors are less and less likely to use expressions of overt racial animosity in making 
official decisions. In order to ferret out impermissible anticompetitive behavior, 
antitrust law developed what are termed “plus factors” to differentiate suspicious 
business decisions from strategic managerial judgments that may be either the prod-
uct of actual conspiratorial activity or just a product of self-interest. For example, 
outwardly similar conduct could be the result of impermissible coordinated pricing 
among competitors, or it could be the result of nonconspiratorial conscious parallel-
ism in which firms watch for market signals from industry leaders.17 The same con-
duct can result from rational self-interest in markets commanded by one player, as 
well as from active collusion among rival firms.18 Indeed, the limited role of plus 
factors as circumstantial evidence of misbehavior rather than as categorical prohibi-
tions or requirements was key to the Supreme Court allowing a motion to dismiss as 
a matter of law in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,19 a case in which the failure of 
firms to enter each other’s geographic markets was explicable on rational self-
interest grounds, rather than presumptively establishing the fact of collusion.20 
The first take-away for voting rights purposes from these two developments in 
antitrust law is the use of evidentiary rules to differentiate the permissible from the 
impermissible. As antitrust law progressed from the clear cases of major trusts into 
the fine-grained distinctions in conduct in complex markets, a broad-gauged set of 
fixed rules yielded to contextual understandings applied as standards. The antitrust 
standards tried to tease out whether the challenged conduct was reasonable in the 
rule-of-reason domain or whether it triggered certain warning bells in the per se rule 
against anticompetitive collusion. The discussion that follows compresses neces-
sarily the difference between the per se rules that are intended to get at conspiratorial 
intent and the rule-of-reason standards that assess impact on competitive balance 
                                                                                                                 
 
 16. See, e.g., Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 488 (1977) 
(“The antitrust laws . . . were enacted for ‘the protection of competition, not competitors.’” 
(emphasis in original) (quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962))).  
 17. See Darryl Snider & Irving Scher, Conscious Parallelism or Conspiracy?, in 2 ISSUES 
IN COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY 1143, 1144 (Wayne Dale Collins et al. eds., 2008) (noting 
that the difference between actual agreement and conscious parallelism remains “the touch-
stone of whether the pricing behavior constitutes a violation,” notwithstanding “that the result-
ing loss of consumer welfare is the same” under both forms of behavior). See generally 
William E. Kovacic, Robert C. Marshall, Leslie M. Marx & Halbert L. White, Plus Factors 
and Agreement in Antitrust Law, 110 MICH. L. REV. 393 (2011). 
 18. See ANDREW I. GAVIL, WILLIAM E. KOVACIC & JONATHAN B. BAKER, ANTITRUST LAW 
IN PERSPECTIVE: CASES, CONCEPTS AND PROBLEMS IN COMPETITION POLICY 267–68 (2d ed. 
2008). 
 19. 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
 20. Id. at 552. 
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regardless of motivation or collusion. These two strands of antitrust law reflect the 
divide in public law between intentional discrimination and discriminatory effects. 
But as in public law, the two strands may merge in the evidentiary tools they 
employ.21  
Inferential proof has taken hold in antitrust, even where the focus is on conspiracy 
to monopolize. The more the conduct implicates plus factors—that is, factors that 
one would not expect to see in properly functioning markets, such as exchanges of 
price information among rivals or alterations in market prices seemingly not driven 
by the elasticity of supply and demand22—the more confidence courts could have in 
the supposition that something is amiss and requires some additional explanation. 
The advantage of this burden shifting inquiry was that it did not have to label any 
exchange of price information as per se illegal, nor even try to anticipate when such 
exchanges might be beneficial. Rather, the existence of plus factors raises the burden 
of justification on the implicated firms to justify their conduct, even where none of 
the challenged conduct is in and of itself prohibited.  
Standards always admit of imprecision. The appeal of the plus-factor approach 
from antitrust is that it allows the existence of prohibited conduct to be proven 
inferentially. The presence of anomalous behavior allows suspicion to be raised with-
out direct evidence of conspiratorial activity by allowing the burden of production to 
shift and requiring the defendant to explain the curious activities. As a result, it is not 
unlawful to raise prices in the face of declining demand, nor is it necessarily improper 
to constrict output in the face of raising demand. It is not even unlawful to play golf 
at the same club and at the same time as the CEO of a rival firm. But an intuition of 
suspicion begins to emerge. As Adam Smith once noted, “[p]eople of the same trade 
seldom meet together, even for merriment and diversion, but the conversation ends 
in a conspiracy against the public, or in some contrivance to raise prices.”23 The 
evidentiary pieces mount, and the presence of otherwise unexplained plus factors 
may serve to condemn conduct that, standing alone, might survive judicial scrutiny.24  
                                                                                                                 
 
 21. Thus, for example, following the Court’s decision in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 
229 (1976), equal protection law required proof of invidious intent as a necessary element of 
a constitutional violation. In practice, a key issue was the evidence needed for proof of that 
intent, whether by direct evidence of subjective motivation, see Pers. Adm’r v. Feeney, 442 
U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (noting the lack of evidence that state legislation was enacted “‘because 
of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects upon an identifiable group”), or by inferential 
proof that the effects were so manifest as to establish a presumption of intent, see Vill. of 
Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977) (allowing inferential 
proof of intent from effects of challenged action, though cautioning that it is only in “rare” 
cases where “a clear pattern, unexplainable on grounds other than race, emerges” that impact 
alone is sufficient to establish intent). 
 22. A compilation of plus factors may be found in RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 
79–93 (2d ed. 2001). See also Snider & Scher, supra note 17, at 1155–60. 
 23. 1 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF 
NATIONS 144 (Edwin Cannan ed., Univ. of Chi. Press 1976) (1904), quoted in Bell Atlantic v. 
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 591 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 24. Along these lines, the Fourth Circuit recently chided the Middle District of North 
Carolina for not holistically considering a number of plus factors. N.C. State Conference of 
the NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204, 214 (4th Cir. July 29, 2016) (“In holding that the 
legislature did not enact the challenged provisions with discriminatory intent, the court seems 
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A second takeaway from antitrust also emerges. If the rule of reason floundered 
about without an objective for judicial inquiry, so too might a rule of reason in voting 
rights law. The strength of a balancing inquiry, removed from rigid per se rules, is 
the flexibility it offers in focusing on context rather than categorical prohibitions. 
Until the goal of antitrust began to be framed in the language of consumer welfare, 
the loose factors of rule-of-reason cases looked more like a laundry list of issues that 
had come up in some case or another than the application of law. The issue for this 
Article is whether a “voter welfare” paradigm can emerge to lend order to a nascent 
voting-rights rule of reason.   
II. RULE OF REASON IN APPLICATION 
Let’s clearly contextualize the legal challenges of concern. Ohio on the eve of the 
2012 presidential elections sought to curtail early voting options.25 Even with the 
proposed curtailment, Ohio would had have more early-voting days than most states, 
and certainly more than my home state of New York, which has none. Can the Ohio 
law be legally challenged without also declaring New York’s failure to allow early 
voting to be even more unlawful?26 
Or consider the proposed limitations on voter registration in North Carolina. 
Among the reforms was an end the early registration of seventeen-year-old high 
school students, which had allowed them to be ready and eligible to vote as soon as 
they turned eighteen.27 Can such a restriction be challenged without also challenging 
                                                                                                                 
 
to have missed the forest in carefully surveying the many trees.”). 
 25. Supreme Court Allows Ohio Early Voting To Continue, BBC NEWS (Oct. 16, 2012), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-19971284 [https://perma.cc/NV4F-HURT]. 
 26. Ohio Secretary of State Jon Husted motioned toward such an objective standard in 
defending the state’s subsequent elimination of “Golden Week,” during which voters had been 
able to both register and vote on the same day. “Noting that ‘for nearly 200 years, Ohioans 
voted for only one day,’ Mr. Husted said, ‘If it was constitutional for lawmakers to expand the 
voting period to 35 days, it must also be constitutional for the same legislative body to amend 
the time frame to 28 days.’” Richard Pérez-Peña, Ohio’s Limits on Early Voting Are 
Discriminatory, Judge Says, N.Y. TIMES (May 24, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05 
/25/us/ohios-limits-on-early-voting-are-discriminatory-judge-says.html [https://perma.cc 
/AN6R-FKMH]. But see Ohio Org. Collaborative v. Husted, No. 2:15-cv-1802, 2016 WL 
3248030, at *39 (S.D. Ohio May 24, 2016) (“[T]he [c]ourt need not identify an objective 
benchmark against which to assess the burdens imposed by the challenged provisions . . . . 
Rather, the relevant benchmark is inherently built into § 2 claims and is whether members of 
the minority have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the 
political process and elect representatives of their choice.”), rev’d sub nom. Ohio Democratic 
Party v. Husted, No. 16-3561, 2016 WL 4437605 (6th Cir. Aug. 23, 2016) (“The Constitution 
does not require any opportunities for early voting . . . . [Plaintiffs] insist that Ohio’s prior 
accommodation—35 days of early voting, which also created a six-day ‘Golden Week’ 
opportunity for same-day registration and voting—established a federal floor that Ohio may 
add to but never subtract from. This is an astonishing proposition.”). 
 27. Anne Blythe, Elimination of NC Voter Preregistration Program Creates Confusion 
for DMV and Elections Officials, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER (July 2, 2014, 8:50 PM), 
http://www.charlotteobserver.com/news/politics-government/article9137564.html [https:// 
perma.cc/79WA-JTFX]. 
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the failure of New York State (home to many of the nation’s worst voting laws) to 
engage in any voter registration outreach at all?  
Or consider the current challenges to the imposition of stricter voter identification 
requirements in Texas.28 I recently voted in a local referendum on land trust issues 
in rural Connecticut, where I have a home. (Connecticut permits non-primary 
homeowners to vote on local matters.)29 As soon as I entered the polling place, I was 
asked to produce my driver’s license to establish my eligibility to vote, much as if I 
had entered any office building in midtown Manhattan, not to mention any building 
affiliated with NYU Law School. If the Texas identification requirement is legally 
infirm, does this mean that local Connecticut voting practices are also unlawful? 
In terms of this article, the question is whether there is a set of contextual factors, 
plus factors if one will, that can guide a principled judicial inquiry into impermissible 
restrictions on the franchise. The discussion that follows attempts to trace the emer-
gence of a set of practices in voting rights law that looks like the nascent steps toward 
the emergence of a voting-rights rule of reason.  
To continue the antitrust analogy for one more step, the search is for approaches 
that do not resemble per se rules of prohibition, largely inherited from a period in 
which impermissible racial considerations dominated both the malum in se and the 
Court’s doctrinal response. Voting rights law was premised on constitutional and 
statutory concerns that the animating purpose of many franchise regulations was the 
continued subjugation of minority voters, particularly under the remnants of Jim 
Crow. The Constitution was used to condemn purposeful arrangements designed to 
keep black citizens from voting, and the Voting Rights Act of 196530 put an end to 
many subterfuges, such as the imposition of literacy tests as a condition of voting. In 
particular, the VRA not only banned the use of such restrictive devices but effectively 
placed the offending jurisdictions under federal oversight by requiring that all further 
actions taken on voter eligibility be “precleared” by the Department of Justice. 
The rigid tests either under the preclearance regime of Section 5 of the VRA or 
under the Constitution were focused on the threshold considerations of the use of 
race or the comparative racial impact. Any backstepping in minority voting prospects 
would prompt withering Department of Justice review under the nonretrogression 
standard of Beer v. United States.31 Similarly, once it could be established that race 
commanded official decision making, constitutional strict scrutiny was virtually 
unyielding. Even outside the domain of race, the Court, in Anderson v. Celebrezze,32 
opened the door to a set of potentially unrealistic burdens of justification on 
administration of the election system, relying on the “fundamental” quality of 
                                                                                                                 
 
 28. See, e.g., Daniel Setiawan, After Six-Year Fight, Perry Signs Voter ID into Law, TEX. 
OBSERVER (May 27, 2011, 4:17 PM), https://www.texasobserver.org/voter-id-signed-into 
-law/ [https://perma.cc/56TV-YLFZ]. 
 29. Ashira Pelman Ostrow, Note, Dual Resident Voting: Traditional Disenfranchisement 
and Prospects for Change, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1954, 1964 (2002).  
 30. Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (1965) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
52 U.S.C.). 
 31. 425 U.S. 130, 141 (1976) (“[T]he purpose of § 5 has always been to insure that no 
voting-procedure changes would be made that would lead to a retrogression in the position of 
racial minorities with respect to their effective exercise of the electoral franchise.”). 
 32. 460 U.S. 780 (1983). 
2016] VOTER WELFARE  307 
 
electoral participation under the First Amendment to necessitate a showing that 
proposed restrictions were the least restrictive able to accomplish the state objective.  
As occurred in antitrust after the first wave of trust-busting, the prohibitory regime 
swept too broadly to command effectively in the normal operation of the electoral 
arena. Anderson well illustrates the paradoxical commands in this area of law. At 
issue was an Ohio filing deadline for presidential candidates that required submission 
of petition signatures in April of an election year in order to be on the ballot. John 
Anderson announced his candidacy shortly after the filing deadline, and his petitions 
were accordingly rejected by the Secretary of State when submitted. The easy part 
of the case was finding that the ability of a candidate to get on the ballot and the 
ability of citizens to cast ballots for the candidate of their choice implicated core First 
Amendment concerns.33 The difficult part was that every regulation necessarily 
implicated access to the political process, as formulated by Justice Stevens: 
We have recognized that, “as a practical matter, there must be a substan-
tial regulation of elections if they are to be fair and honest and if some 
sort of order, rather than chaos, is to accompany the democratic pro-
cesses.” To achieve these necessary objectives, States have enacted 
comprehensive and sometimes complex election codes. Each provision 
of these schemes, whether it governs the registration and qualifications 
of voters, the selection and eligibility of candidates, or the voting process 
itself, inevitably affects—at least to some degree—the individual's right 
to vote and his right to associate with others for political ends. Neverthe-
less, the state’s important regulatory interests are generally sufficient to 
justify reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions.34 
This was certainly sensible. However, the Court then crafted a test that brought elec-
tion regulation perilously close to the generally crushing least-restrictive-means 
analysis from First Amendment law: 
[A court] must first consider the character and magnitude of the asserted 
injury to the rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments 
that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate. It then must identify and evaluate the 
precise interests put forward by the State as justifications for the burden 
imposed by its rule. In passing judgment, the Court must not only deter-
mine the legitimacy and strength of each of those interests, it also must 
consider the extent to which those interests make it necessary to burden 
the plaintiff’s rights.35 
The Court then struck down the Ohio filing deadline as insufficiently “precisely 
drawn” to the state interests in administering its political system, a holding which 
                                                                                                                 
 
 33. Id. at 787 (“[T]he state laws place burdens on two different, although overlapping, 
kinds of rights—the right of individuals to associate for the advancement of political beliefs, 
and the right of qualified voters, regardless of their political persuasion, to cast their votes 
effectively. Both of these rights, of course, rank among our most precious freedoms.” (quoting 
Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U. S. 23, 30 (1968))). 
 34. Id. at 788 (citation omitted) (quoting Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974)). 
 35. Id. at 789 (emphasis added). 
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strongly resembled the least-restrictive-means test that would disable much state 
administration of elections. Perhaps paradoxically, this last portion of the Anderson 
test was the most sweeping, yet it received little traction as courts realized that a 
least-restrictive-means analysis would doom an 8 p.m. poll closing hour as compared 
to 8:15 p.m., 8:15 p.m. as compared to 8:30, and on endlessly. Instead, Anderson 
would come to be domesticated, as we shall see, into an open-textured examination 
of the totality of the circumstances in what became known as the Anderson/Burdick 
test.36 
What had previously emerged in the stricter prohibitory days was a curious 
jurisprudence in which either voting access and other challenged electoral matters 
failed under exacting scrutiny, or they were held to be administrative and virtually 
immune from review.37 States could regulate with little judicial oversight so long as 
they stayed within the familiar boundaries of generally applicable rules on voter 
registration, polling-site hours, and the like. Any constitutional scrutiny was fatal, 
but the domain of constitutional concern was circumscribed. In similar fashion, one 
person, one vote pushed toward higher and higher levels of mathematical exacti-
tude,38 except when it categorically did not apply.39 And either redistricting was so 
racially coded as to invoke strict scrutiny,40 or it existed outside the bounds of any 
meaningful review as partisan manipulation.41 
Each of these rules of prohibition resembles the per se applications of the core 
concerns of antitrust law. But such per se prohibitions are too narrow in their scope 
and too overwhelming in their application to serve a more nuanced set of challenges 
to the franchise. In what follows, I will address the ways in which courts, and lower 
courts specifically, have tried to fill the gap in voting-rights law. To return to the 
question posed by Professor Bork in the antitrust context, to lend coherence to this 
case law requires asking for a definition of the harm and the aims of the ensuing 
prohibitions.  
A. Setting the Stage 
The Seventh Circuit provides a useful introduction to recent litigation over voter 
access, specifically challenges to the requirement of state-issued identification for in 
person voting on Election Day. Both Indiana and Wisconsin in the past few years 
introduced ID requirements for voting, and both were subject to high-profile litiga-
tion. These cases are also illustrative because the reforms were pushed through by 
                                                                                                                 
 
 36. See Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992). 
 37. See, e.g., Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 920 (1995) (striking down Congressional 
redistricting plan drawn along racial lines).  
 38. See Cox v. Larios, 542 U.S. 947, 949 (2004) (mem.) (Stevens, J., concurring); Karcher 
v. Daggett, 426 U.S. 725, 736 (1983). But see Tennant v. Jefferson Cty. Comm’n, 133 S. Ct. 
3 (2012) (per curiam) (accepting state interest in minimizing population transfers between 
districts, even though improved technology allowed plans with lower population deviations). 
 39. See Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355, 371 (1981); Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin 
Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719, 730–31 (1973). 
 40. See Miller, 515 U.S. at 920; Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 653–55 (1993). 
 41. E.g., Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 258 (2001); see also, e.g., Vieth v. Jubelirer, 
541 U.S. 267 (2004); Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986). 
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Republican control of the state, and because both are states that were outside the 
traditional southern focus of the VRA. Neither Wisconsin nor Indiana were subject 
to the administrative preclearance requirements of Section 5, meaning that any litiga-
tion to thwart these changes would have to take the form of an affirmative challenge 
under Section 2 of the VRA or a direct challenge under the Constitution. Further, the 
Indiana litigation went to the U.S. Supreme Court in Crawford v. Marion County 
Election Board,42 the Court’s first encounter with the nascent movement to restrict 
voter access and in turn became the touchstone for the current round of voting-rights 
claims.  
Crawford sets out a familiar equal-protection hurdle for plaintiffs in voter-access 
challenges. As has become commonplace in recent years, a Republican-controlled 
state legislature pushed through a series of identification requirements aimed at 
combatting a claimed risk of vote fraud. Justice Stevens began by acknowledging 
that the Indiana ID requirements imposed a burden on voters, and went on to further 
acknowledge that the record was devoid of any evidence of in-person voter 
impersonation fraud at any point in Indiana history.  Nonetheless, the Court held that 
this was insufficient to make out an equal-protection claim. In order for the statute 
to be constitutionally objectionable, more was required than just showing that it was 
burdensome or irrational. Rather, as a facial challenge to the Indiana statute, plaintiffs 
bore “a heavy burden of persuasion”43 to show “that the statute imposes ‘excessively 
burdensome requirements’ on any class of voters.”44 That in turn required some proof 
that voters were in fact unable to vote, something that is hard to establish ahead of 
time and difficult even to show retrospectively if prospective voters are dissuaded 
from even trying to go to the polling sites. With only six elderly plaintiffs as exam-
ples of impact, and with a record bereft of actual inability to vote by others, the 
Indiana challenge fell flat.  
In Frank v. Walker, the most recent Wisconsin case, Judge Easterbrook 
generalized from Crawford to adopt an analytic framework taken from disparate 
impact law.45 Under such an approach, the predicate for any finding of impropriety 
in the use of entry-level criteria must be the statistically robust separation of an 
identifiable group of claimants. It is not enough to isolate an effect without the group-
based differentiation. Thus, “any procedural step filters out some potential voters,” 
so if the photo ID has the effect of removing a particular voter, it should only indicate 
that, standing alone, that voter was “unwilling to invest the necessary time.”46 Under 
this standard, the evidence did not bear out the disparate impact across groups of 
voters: “The [district court] judge in Indiana thought, just as the judge in Wisconsin 
has found, that some voters would be unable, as a practical matter, to get photo 
IDs . . . but could not ascertain how many people were in that category. The trial in 
Wisconsin produced the same inability to quantify.”47  
By contrast, in her dissent from the denial of rehearing en banc in Crawford, Chief 
Judge Wood devised a test modeled on disparate-treatment law, the identification of 
                                                                                                                 
 
 42. 553 U.S. 181 (2008). 
 43. Id. at 200 (plurality opinion). 
 44. Id. at 202 (quoting Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 738 (1974)). 
 45. 768 F.3d 744, 746 (7th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1551 (2015). 
 46. Id. at 748–49 (emphasis in original). 
 47. Id. at 748 (emphasis in original). 
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a pattern of differentiation as evidence of malevolent intent:  
[W]hen there is a serious risk that an election law has been passed with 
the intent of imposing an additional significant burden on the right to 
vote of a specific group of voters, the court must apply strict scrutiny. 
. . . . 
. . . The law challenged in this case will harm an identifiable and 
often-marginalized group of voters to some undetermined degree. This 
court should take significant care, including satisfactorily considering 
the motives behind such a law, before discounting such an injury.48 
Under such an approach, a limited showing of suspect motive plus the risk of harm 
requires a high level of scrutiny as to the true intent of the underlying conduct.  
Faced with similar attempts to cabin voter access, these two leading judges 
attempted to fit exclusion within traditional categories that have been defined largely 
through the prism of discrimination law, the one turning on the robustness of the 
statistical proof of group-based harm, the other on a searching inquiry into motive. 
At the same time, Judge Posner began to point the inquiry in a different direction. 
After joining the majority in the Seventh Circuit in Crawford, Judge Posner had a 
well-publicized change of heart focused heavily on the limited inquiry offered by the 
absence of proof of impact from the Indiana statute.49 By the time of the Wisconsin 
litigation, however, Posner began offering a rationale for skepticism of such laws 
grounded not so much in the discrimination against identifiable subgroups of the 
population but on the limitations on the appropriate competitive accountability of 
current incumbent political power: “There is only one motivation for imposing bur-
dens on voting that are ostensibly designed to discourage voter-impersonation fraud, 
if there is no actual danger of such fraud, and that is to discourage voting by persons 
likely to vote against the party responsible for imposing burdens.”50  
B. A Rule of Reason for Elections 
Two sets of cases provide the backdrop for the rule-of-reason analysis in voting-
rights law, one involving statutory claims under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 
the other constitutional claims. Each involves a challenge to altered rules for the abil-
ity to cast a vote, with one dealing with voter identification requirements and the 
other with the availability of early in-person voting. What unifies them for purposes 
                                                                                                                 
 
 48. Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 484 F.3d 436, 437, 439 (7th Cir. 2007) 
(Wood, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). 
 49. Richard L. Hasen, Why Judge Posner Changed His Mind on Voter ID Laws, DAILY 
BEAST (Oct. 23, 2013, 2:35 PM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/10/23 
/why-judge-posner-is-right-on-voter-id-laws.html [https://perma.cc/KD3T-52VB]. 
 50. Frank v. Walker, 773 F.3d 783, 796 (7th Cir. 2014) (Posner, J., dissenting from denial 
of rehearing en banc). Recently, the Western District of Wisconsin has questioned the likely 
continued vitality of Crawford and Frank. See One Wis. Inst., Inc. v. Thomsen, No. 15-cv-
324-jdp, 2016 WL 4059222, at *10 (W.D. Wis. July 29, 2016) (“Crawford and Frank deserve 
reappraisal. The court is skeptical that voter ID laws engender confidence in elections, which 
is one of the important governmental purposes that courts have used to sustain the 
constitutionality of those laws.”). 
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here is that both apply doctrines not generally directed at voting practices to craft a 
nuanced test for the relationship between the stated state objective and the burdens 
imposed on would-be voters. Together these cases push toward a standard of inquiry 
more typically associated with constitutional balancing law or, in fact, with the sort 
of proportionality analysis that has come to dominate German, Canadian, Israeli, 
South African, and other maturing constitutional analyses.51  
Each line of cases begins by identifying a threshold burden on the franchise and 
then shifts the bulk of the judicial inquiry to the state’s justification for the burden. 
Each eschews any rigid ruling that the claim to a particular form of identification or 
a particular form of early voting is an entitlement. At the same time, each carefully 
sidesteps any finding of improper purpose or animus on the part of state officials. 
Rather, each concludes by finding that the state fails to meet a burden of justification 
for proving that the claimed state objectives are best addressed at the cost of the 
associated burdens upon prospective voters.  
1. Crafting a Constitutional Test out of Anderson/Burdick 
The first doctrinal approach is exemplified by Obama for America v. Husted 
(OFA),52 a constitutional challenge to Ohio restrictions on the availability of early 
voting, restrictions that were adopted on the eve of the 2012 presidential election. 
After well-documented difficulties with long voting lines in 2004, Ohio had extended 
early voting opportunities, something that proved particularly popular with black 
voters who were mobilized in a “souls-to-polls” practice of voting on the Sunday 
before the election. In the run-up to the presidential election, Ohio shut down early 
voting on the last weekend of the election cycle, except that military and other voters 
stationed overseas could submit in-person early voting ballots. The idea that a state 
office was open to receive ballots from some voters, but would turn others away, was 
a peculiar attempt to comply with federal military voting statutes and in turn 
prompted the constitutional challenge.  
Obama for America was therefore framed to claim that a state could not 
differentiate in providing early voting access to some but not all voters—especially 
when, at least anecdotally, there was reason to believe that the removed voter access 
was particularly popular among black voters. The reduction of early voting did not 
translate into a denial of a fundamental right, nor did having to vote on election day 
or on some other early voting date readily equate to a burden on the franchise along 
the lines of a poll tax.  Nonetheless, the line of demarcation of military versus civil-
ians did not trigger easy equal-protection lines of division along familiar categories 
such as race or national origin. Instead, the entire enterprise smacked of misuse of 
state authority to attempt to alter election outcomes. The Sixth Circuit adopted a 
poorly elaborated First Amendment test, known colloquially as the 
Burdick/Anderson test, to nonetheless get at impermissible conduct: 
                                                                                                                 
 
 51. See generally Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutional Law in an Age of Proportionality, 124 
YALE L.J. 3094, 3099 & n.22 (2015). 
 52. 697 F.3d 423, 434 (6th Cir. 2012). Disclaimer: I worked on this case on behalf of 
Obama for America. 
312 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL  [Vol. 92:299 
 
A court considering a challenge to a state election law must weigh “the 
character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights protected by 
the First and Fourteenth Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to vindi-
cate” against “the precise interests put forward by the State as justifica-
tions for the burden imposed by its rule,” taking into consideration “the 
extent to which those interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiffs’ 
rights.”53 
What emerges is a limited inquiry to establish that there are appreciable burdens and 
that the burdens fall on a population lacking means of self-protection in the political 
arena. The importance of the limited threshold inquiry is to move the burden of 
production quickly to the claimed state justification.  
OFA marks a significant step in equal-protection law by not trying to formalize 
the categories of suspect classes or fundamental rights. Classic equal-protection doc-
trine focuses on the forbidden uses of race or other classifications to yield a strong 
set of prohibitions, a per se rule following the antitrust law, by which judicial scrutiny 
is expected to be “strict in theory, but fatal in fact.”54 The form of judicial review 
followed from the motive-based search for invidious intent that characterized so 
much of the post-Brown era. Any search for malevolent intent, if successful, cannot 
yield other than a categorical prohibition. On the other hand, administrative conduct 
that neither touches on a suspect classification nor implicates directly a core constitu-
tional right is subject to rational-relation scrutiny, a decidedly deferential standard. 
The picture is complicated by the rise of intermediate levels of scrutiny and the ef-
forts to differentiate facial from as-applied challenges. But the heart of this form of 
constitutional analysis has always been the search for formal categories that avoid 
calibrated judicial judgments, or at least appear to do so.  
By contrast, the Sixth Circuit did not fine-tune an analysis of whether the 
classification of overseas versus in-state voters was suspect, nor did it try to specify 
the appropriate tier of scrutiny for the novel franchise restriction. Rather than getting 
bogged down over what level of scrutiny applies, the court found that “we review 
the claim using the ‘flexible standard’ outlined in” Burdick and Anderson.55 Thus, 
OFA begins not with the formal doctrinal step of identifying categories of harm and 
associated level of judicial scrutiny. Instead, the court moved directly to find that a 
threshold burden on the franchise would serve as a source of constitutional concern. 
The curtailment of early voting opportunities and the differentiation between military 
and nonmilitary voters make voting harder than it had been for the broad mass of 
nonoverseas, nonmilitary voters to exercise the franchise. That suffices to get the 
constitutional ball rolling. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 53. Id. at 429 (quoting Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992) (quoting Anderson 
v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983))); see also One Wis. Inst., 2016 WL 4059222, at *3 
(“This analysis proceeds under . . . the Anderson-Burdick framework, which sets out a three-
step analysis. First, I determine the extent of the burden imposed . . . . Second, I evaluate the 
interest that the state offers to justify that burden. Third, I judge whether the interest justifies 
the burden.”).  
 54. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 519 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring in 
judgment). 
 55. Obama for Am., 697 F.3d at 429. 
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Yet the effect on the franchise standing alone does not enshrine such early ing 
either with the character of an unalterable entitlement, nor subject to a non-
retrogression analysis as would have been applied were Ohio subject to Section 5 of 
the VRA. Instead, the fact that the franchise was more burdened than it had been 
serves to shift the judicial inquiry to the state’s justification for the burden. No state 
is compelled to either provide a minimum amount of process nor forbidden to unwind 
experiments that have proven unsuccessful or unnecessary. Rather, the inquiry leads 
quickly to the question of the rationale for the state’s action and the means/ends fit. 
This allowed the court to examine the state’s justifications that polling officials were 
too busy preparing for Election Day to keep early voting hours available the weekend 
before the election and that only military service members and their family were 
uniquely burdened by not having voting opportunities on that last weekend. The state 
failed to discharge its burden of production, with the court finding that “the State has 
shown no evidence indicating how this election will be more onerous than the numer-
ous other elections that have been successfully administered in Ohio since early vot-
ing was put into place in 2005.”56 Further, given the low burden on the state of 
maintaining early voting, “the State has offered no justification for not providing 
similarly situated voters those same opportunities” as were being afforded to 
overseas military and their families.57 The failure of Ohio to satisfy its burden of 
establishing the state’s substantial interest in the election reforms resulted in the court 
holding them unconstitutional.  
OFA and a consistent run of Sixth Circuit cases introduce a distinct electoral 
mechanism into equal-protection law. Dispensing with formalistic distinctions of 
tiers of scrutiny and boundaries of classifications, the resulting doctrine is far more 
pragmatic, asking basically if there is an identifiable burden on the franchise and, if 
so, whether it is really necessary.58 These cases formalize the intuition expressed by 
Judge Posner concerning the deep-rooted impropriety of incumbent authorities using 
election-eligibility rules to try to sway the outcome of an election.  
 2. Recasting Section 2 of the VRA 
Alternatively, courts have been using Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act to yield 
an inquiry much like that crafted by the Sixth Circuit under the Constitution. The 
obvious difficulty is that the VRA, like the constitutional test under equal protection, 
was aimed at a different set of concerns. Section 2 was written to create a non-intent 
based “results” test to address the dilutive impact of at-large or multimember voting 
districts on minority electoral prospects.  As interpreted by the Supreme Court in 
                                                                                                                 
 
 56. Id. at 433. 
 57. Id. at 435. 
 58. See Ohio Org. Collaborative v. Husted, No. 2:15-cv-1802, 2016 WL 5248030, at *13–
22 (S.D. Ohio May 24, 2016) (applying the OFA framework to hold unconstitutional the state’s 
elimination of same-day voter registration, which the court found imposed a modest burden 
on African Americans that was not justified by the state’s interests in preventing voter fraud 
and reducing costs and administrative burdens), rev’d sub nom. Ohio Democratic Party v. 
Husted, No. 16-3561, 2016 WL 4437605 (6th Cir. Aug. 23, 2016). 
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Thornburg v. Gingles,59 the key to Section 2 was the correspondence between ra-
cially identifiable patterns of voting and the electoral prospects of minority-
supported candidates. Under Gingles, historically divergent voting patterns between 
the races combined with a lack of minority electoral success to demonstrate that on-
going minority exclusion from elective office was the result of discrete structural 
obstacles, such as at-large elections. Modern voting-rights law assumed that the sim-
ple elements of the ability to register and vote—what in the literature is termed first-
generation voting-rights issues—had been realized and the battleground had shifted 
to the prospects for electoral success and realized political power. Neither altered 
voter registration requirements nor altered rules for the casting of ballots fits the his-
toric voting inquiry of polarized voting, nor could their prospective alteration reliably 
predict electoral gains or losses for minority-preferred candidates.  
As a result, as noted by the Fourth Circuit in League of Women Voters v. North 
Carolina,60 there is a “paucity” of law under Section 2 of the VRA dealing with voter 
exclusion. In the covered jurisdictions under Section 5, including North Carolina, 
this was addressed in the first stages after 1965 and largely remained a secondary 
issue of implementation thereafter. Section 5 imposed a form of strict liability in 
which any potential for adverse impact on minority voters was a sufficient basis for 
refusal of administrative preclearance by the Department of Justice. The Fourth 
Circuit recognized the interaction between the ability of Section 5 to prune first-
generation obstacles and the Section 2 concerns for the second-generation 
effectiveness of the franchise: “[T]he predominance of vote dilution in Section 2 
jurisprudence likely stems from the effectiveness of the now-defunct Section 5 pre-
clearance requirements that stopped would-be vote denial from occurring in covered 
jurisdictions like large parts of North Carolina.”61 
But with Section 5 no longer operative after Shelby County, there was no 
difference between the Southern states that were its primary concern and states like 
Indiana or Wisconsin. When confronted with a package of voter-eligibility reforms, 
a growing list of putatively antifraud provisions, the Fourth Circuit could rely neither 
on either the nonretrogression standard of Section 5, nor on the typical vote dilution 
concern of Section 2. Instead, the Fourth Circuit wrote into the VRA a standard mod-
eled directly on Husted’s constitutional interpretation of Anderson/Burdick: 
First, “the challenged ‘standard, practice, or procedure’ must impose 
a discriminatory burden on members of a protected class, meaning that 
members of the protected class ‘have less opportunity than other mem-
bers of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect 
representatives of their choice.’” 
Second, that burden “must in part be caused by or linked to ‘social 
and historical conditions’ that have or currently produce discrimination 
against members of the protected class.”62  
                                                                                                                 
 
 59. 478 U.S. 30, 47–59 (1986).  
 60. 769 F.3d 224, 239 (4th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1735 (2015).  
 61. Id.  
 62. Id. at 240 (citations omitted) (quoting Ohio State Conference of NAACP v. Husted, 
728 F.3d 524, 554 (6th Cir. 2014)). 
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The revised statutory framework is further elaborated in Veasey v. Abbott,63 where 
a panel of the Fifth Circuit upheld a portion of a lower court’s rejection of new voter 
ID requirements but did so under a judicially crafted application of Section 2 of the 
Voting Rights Act.64 In Veasey, the Fifth Circuit reviewed a district court decision 
that struck down the new Texas voter identification requirement under a panoply of 
conventional civil rights analyses: as intentionally discriminatory, as violative of 
Section 2 of the VRA, and as unconstitutional for serving as a poll tax. Strikingly, 
the Fifth Circuit ushered the inquiry away from either discriminatory intent or a 
categorical right of the plaintiffs. Purposeful discrimination claims poorly fit the 
complicated partisan intrigue over the right to vote and unnecessarily force the courts 
to condemn political actors: 
We recognize that evaluating motive, particularly the motive of dozens 
of people, is a difficult enterprise. We recognize the charged nature of 
accusations of racism, particularly against a legislative body, but we also 
recognize the sad truth that racism continues to exist in our modern 
American society despite years of laws designed to eradicate it.65 
Instead of reaching out to label the political maneuverings in Texas as racist, 66 or 
indulging a strained analogy to a poll tax, the Fifth Circuit turned to Section 2 of the 
Voting Rights Act as the source of voter protection. As in North Carolina, the obvi-
ous difficulty is that Section 2 was written to address the dilutive impact of at-large 
voting districts, and the Gingles gloss squarely directed judicial inquiry to historical 
voting patterns to demonstrate ongoing minority exclusion from elective office. Al-
tered voter registration requirements or altered rules for the casting of ballots neither 
fit the historic voting inquiry of polarized voting nor reliably predict electoral gains 
or losses for minority-preferred candidates. The court instead hopscotched across the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 63. 796 F.3d 487, 509 (5th Cir. 2015) (using the Senate Report factors of Section 2 to 
yield an inquiry for denial of the right to vote rather than vote dilution), aff’d in part, rev’d in 
part, vacated in part, 830 F.3d 216 (5th Cir. 2016) (en banc). 
 64. Although the Fifth Circuit has taken the Texas case en banc, thereby vacating the 
panel ruling, the panel opinion remains exemplary of an approach that is emerging across 
courts and across different formal categories of claims. The en banc decision, Veasey v. Abbott, 
830 F.3d 216 (5th Cir. 2016) (en banc), remains largely consistent with the prior panel deci-
sion, although there are differences, see infra note 66. 
 65. Veasey, 796 F.3d at 499; see also Veasey, 830 F.3d at 231 (using nearly identical 
language). 
 66. The en banc court demonstrated less reticence in discussing evidence of the legisla-
ture's discriminatory intent, holding as the prior panel had that much of the evidence relied on 
by the district court was infirm but also emphasizing that there existed considerable evidence 
pointing to discriminatory intent.  See Veasey, 830 F.3d at 234–42.  That included evidence of 
ameliorative measures that the legislature declined to adopt and of the extraordinary proce-
dural maneuvers used to pass the law, both of which the prior panel had regarded as less 
weighty.  Compare 830 F.3d at 236–38, with 796 F.3d at 503.  The sensitivity surrounding the 
court's openness to a finding that the legislature harbored discriminatory intent is singled out 
for critique by the dissents, which accuse the majority of engaging in “perniciously irresponsi-
ble racial name-calling” and “encourag[ing] witch hunts for racism.”  Veasey, 830 F.3d at 281 
(Jones, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 325–26 (Clement, J., dissenting in part). 
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Senate Report factors from the 1982 amendment to Section 267 to focus on (a) proof 
of a discrete vulnerability of minority voters to being excluded as a result of the 
changed registration and voting practices and (b) the history and effects of past 
discrimination to establish the vulnerability of a minority group. The combination of 
these two, essentially impact plus group status, allows for the burden of justification 
to shift to the state, in similar fashion to the equal-protection analysis in Husted.  
Once shifted, the burden on the state is to justify the necessity of the proposed re-
strictions in light of some clear state objective.  
As it happens, there is a largely disregarded section of the VRA Senate Report 
factors that lists a series of additional considerations that would not typically be in-
cluded in a Section 2 case. One of these turned out to be the generally unworkable 
examination of the “tenuousness” of the challenged state policy, something that is at 
best a stand-in for the pretext inquiry at the last stage of the classic McDonnell 
Douglas68 formulation of burden shifting in a disparate-treatment employment-
discrimination claim. “Tenuousness” is neither an element of the plaintiffs’ burden 
nor a defense to polarized voting yielding minority electoral defeat as formulated by 
the Supreme Court in Gingles. Rather, as with the early rule-of-reason cases that 
emerged in antitrust, tenuousness was inherited from specific case language, then 
tacked on to the laundry list of totality-of-the-circumstances factors that made their 
way into the Senate Report. 
But in the emerging voting-rights cases, tenuousness becomes the statutory hook 
for shifting the inquiry onto the state’s justification for the proposed reform of elec-
toral practices. As Pamela Karlan explains, “[a] policy of pursuing partisan ad-
vantage through restricting the right to vote should be held tenuous as a matter of law 
and should create a strong presumption that a plaintiff who has satisfied the two ele-
ments of the emerging framework has established a violation of section 2.”69 The 
Fourth Circuit in League of Women Voters used this generally peripheral statutory 
analysis as the capstone of its condemnation of some of the “antifraud” provisions of 
the state reforms: “Finally, as to the tenuousness of the reasons given for the re-
strictions, North Carolina asserts goals of electoral integrity and fraud prevention. 
But nothing in the district court’s portrayal of the facts suggests that those are any-
thing other than merely imaginable.”70 Similarly, under the Veasey panel’s analysis, 
the failure of the Texas state policy turns neither on the prohibited status of requiring 
voter identification (hence the failed analogy to a poll tax), nor on the need to corral 
the complicated motivations into a simple account of state racism. The use of altered 
procedures with a differential impact on a vulnerable minority demands a burden of 
justification on the state. Here the proclaimed interest in combatting in personam 
fraud fails as an evidentiary matter, independent of any claimed positive entitlement 
to vote without official identification, and without any need to indict the racial 
                                                                                                                 
 
 67. S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 28–29 (1982) (listing factors indicative of a Section 2 viola-
tion), as reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 206–07. 
 68. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 
 69. Pamela S. Karlan, Turnout, Tenuousness, and Getting Results in Section 2 Vote Denial 
Claims, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 763, 786 (2016). 
 70. League of Women Voters v. North Carolina, 769 F.3d 224, 246 (4th Cir. 2014), cert. 
denied, 135 S. Ct. 1735 (2015). 
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motivations of the state. While elements of this inquiry may be found in the legisla-
tive history of the VRA, or in its applied case law, the resulting legal test is a break-
through under the Act.  
III. THE PLUS FACTORS OF THE RIGHT TO VOTE 
It is now necessary to take some liberties with the antitrust analogy. As a formal 
matter, antitrust law remains divided between the per se prohibition on combinations 
in restraint of trade and a rule-of-reason domain for firm activity that may result in a 
constriction of competition or that may exacerbate a dominant market position. The 
plus-factor analysis, as a technical matter, applies only to the existence of an agree-
ment in restraint of trade, the classic realm of per se prohibitions. In practice, and 
from the wide-eyed gaze of the non-antitrust specialist, the application of the plus-
factor analysis and the rule-of-reason approach share a common-sense intuition that 
at some point there must be some burden on a defendant to account for its behavior.71 
For purposes of the comparison to voting-rights law, it is that shifting of the burden 
of justification that informs the analogy. 
In both statutory and constitutional contexts, a rise in voting-rights plus factors 
—suspicious signs that the right to vote has been violated, even if the mechanisms 
employed are not in themselves illegal—has accompanied the shift away from per se 
prohibitions. An analysis of major circuit-level voting-rights decisions over the last 
decade reveals a number of doctrinal similarities in how courts have approached 
challenges to voting-rights laws and policies. The analogy to antitrust comes with a 
specified set of criteria that are likely to prompt a shifting of the burden of justifica-
tion to the challenged jurisdiction.  
Across the cases, there are both specific factors that trigger court concern and 
more generalizable patterns that emerge as the most salient plus factors. Specific 
issues include procedural irregularities in the adoption of voting changes, passage of 
legislation following other suspicious activity,72 changes that occur in close proxim-
ity to an anticipated close election (especially a presidential election), and one-party 
                                                                                                                 
 
 71. This common-sense intuition is reflected in the case law as well. In California Dental 
Ass’n v. FTC, for example, the Court held that the Ninth Circuit had been wrong to condemn 
a professional association’s prohibition on certain nonprice advertising based on a quick look 
(an abbreviated form of the rule of reason), finding that the restrictions deserved more sus-
tained scrutiny under the rule of reason given a plausible procompetitive justification for them. 
526 U.S. 756 (1999).  
The truth is that our categories of analysis of anticompetitive effect are less fixed 
than terms like “per se,” “quick look,” and “rule of reason” tend to make them 
appear. We have recognized, for example, that “there is often no bright line 
separating per se from Rule of Reason analysis,” since “considerable inquiry into 
market conditions” may be required before the application of any so-called “per 
se” condemnation is justified. 
Id. at 779 (italics in original) (quoting NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 104 n.26 (1984)). 
 72. See N.C. State Conference of the NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204, 214 (4th Cir. 
2016) (“Before enacting that law, the legislature requested data on the use, by race, of a 
number of voting practices. Upon receipt of the race data, the General Assembly enacted 
legislation that restricted voting and registration in five different ways, all of which 
disproportionately affected African Americans.”). 
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exclusive control of the election administration process. More generally, there are 
three factors that integrate elements from the discrimination backdrop of voting 
rights law with a contemporary focus on the integrity of the electoral process. These 
broader concerns can be classified as follows: 
A.  Impact on a Vulnerable Group 
While courts today typically avoid a finding of direct discrimination,73 they 
remain nonetheless attentive to changes in voting rules that place a discernible and 
vulnerable group demonstrably at risk. Thus, courts highlight as a “plus factor” a 
demonstration by plaintiffs that (a) they have suffered under an existing voting sys-
tem in a recent election or (b) their voting patterns in recent elections demonstrate 
that a new law will adversely affect them. For example, in Stewart v. Blackwell, the 
Sixth Circuit instructed the district court on remand to make findings based on the 
“voluminous amount of . . . evidence” the plaintiffs produced showing that black 
voters were far more likely than nonblack voters to reside in “punch-card” counties, 
where the voting system did not provide notice to a voter that they had “overvoted,” 
resulting in the discarding of their ballots.74  
The prospect for future harm as a result of the increased chance that black voters 
might disqualify their ballots by overvoting provided grounds for further review. And 
in the early-voting context of Obama for America v. Husted and Ohio State 
Conference of NAACP v. Husted, the Sixth Circuit credited the plaintiffs for muster-
ing substantial evidence of the disproportionate use of early voting among disadvan-
taged groups in past elections.75 In neither case did the court make a finding either of 
discriminatory intent or of a diminished prospect for the election of the candidates of 
choice of minority voters. Rather, the plus factor was the increased risk of harm suf-
fered by minority voters. Standing alone, that was not sufficient to establish the plain-
tiffs’ claims; rather, the inquiry is part of a preliminary determination of whether a 
burden of production would shift to the defendant. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 73. See One Wis. Inst., Inc. v. Thomsen, No. 15-cv-324-jdp, 2016 WL 4059222, at 
*20 (W.D. Wis. July 29, 2016) (“[T]he court concludes that plaintiffs have not shown by a 
preponderance of the evidence that any of these changes in Wisconsin’s voting laws were 
motivated, even in part, by racial animus.”). But see N.C. State Conference of the NAACP, 
831 F.3d 204, 238 (“We therefore must conclude that race constituted a but-for cause of SL 
2013–381, in violation of the Constitutional and statutory prohibitions on intentional 
discrimination.”). 
 74. Stewart v. Blackwell, 444 F.3d 843, 878–79 (6th Cir. 2006), vacated as moot, 473 
F.3d 692 (6th Cir. 2007) (en banc). 
 75. Ohio State Conference of NAACP v. Husted, 768 F.3d 524, 541–42 (6th Cir. 2014) 
(“Like the plaintiffs in Obama for America, Plaintiffs in this case presented ample evidence 
that African American, lower-income, and homeless voters disproportionately have used in 
past elections the EIP [early in-person] voting times that Directive 2014–17 and SB 238 elimi-
nated . . . .”), vacated, No. 14-3877, 2014 WL 10384647 (6th Cir. Oct. 1, 2014); Obama for 
Am. v. Husted, 697 F.3d 423, 440 (6th Cir. 2012) (describing studies that evaluated past voting 
trends and revealed that black voters had disproportionately taken advantage of early voting 
and would do the same in the upcoming election). 
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B. Absence of Demonstrated Need for Change 
When a state aims to implement new electoral policies, the burden these policies 
will create for voters must not outweigh the state’s proffered justifications for them 
under Anderson/Burdick. In this way, one “plus factor” for plaintiffs under an equal-
protection challenge seems to be evidence of an electoral system that functioned 
smoothly before the law was passed. For instance, in Obama for America v. Husted, 
the Sixth Circuit dismissed the state’s proposal that it would be burdened with an 
extensive early-voting regime because there was “no evidence that local boards of 
elections have struggled to cope with early voting in the past.”76 Similarly, in 
Northeast Ohio Coalition for the Homeless v. Husted, a state effort to modify a 
consent decree on the counting of provisional ballots was rejected based on the state’s 
inability to point to past evidence of dysfunction that it was trying to correct.77 Most 
recently, in One Wisconsin Institute, Inc. v. Thomsen, the Western District of 
Wisconsin questioned a voter ID law that purported to combat fraud but 
disenfranchised real voters.78 
C. Historic Evidence of Disregard 
The modern law of vote dilution emerges from a poorly specified totality-of-the-
factors inquiry into the disadvantaged conditions of minorities in southern jurisdic-
tions. Known historically as the White/Zimmer factors,79 this compendium of eviden-
tiary pieces from various cases looked to a past history of discrimination in education 
and public services, racial conduct in elections (such as slating of white candidates 
or racial appeals in campaigns), election devices that magnified majoritarian ad-
vantage (e.g., at-large elections or numbered posts), and the lack of minority electoral 
success. In turn, these case-derived indicia of minority-vote dilution were incorpo-
rated into the legislative history of the 1982 amendment of Section 2 of the Voting 
Rights Act as the Senate Report factors.  
As is well chronicled, the clunky White/Zimmer inquiry was largely jettisoned in 
Thornburg v. Gingles in favor of a streamlined inquiry into whether polarized voting 
patterns among blacks and whites were the source of minority electoral frustration.80 
The White/Zimmer factors, like their formal inclusion in the Senate Report factors, 
                                                                                                                 
 
 76. Obama for Am., 697 F.3d at 434. 
 77. 696 F.3d 580, 596 (6th Cir. 2012) (“[N]either the State nor amici present evidence 
that county boards err in remaking wrong-precinct ballots to count only votes in ‘up-ballot’ 
races, despite the fact that county boards have followed the practice since the adoption of the 
consent decree in April 2010.”). 
 78. 2016 WL 4059222, at *2 (“The Wisconsin experience demonstrates that a preoccupa-
tion with mostly phantom election fraud leads to real incidents of disenfranchisement, which 
undermine rather than enhance confidence in elections, particularly in minority communities. 
To put it bluntly, Wisconsin’s strict version of voter ID law is a cure worse than the disease.”). 
 79. White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 766–67 (1973); Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 
1297, 1305–06 (5th Cir. 1973), aff’d sub nom. E. Carroll Par. Sch. Bd. v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 
636 (1976).  
 80. See Samuel Issacharoff, Polarized Voting and the Political Process: The 
Transformation of Voting Rights Jurisprudence, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1833, 1850–53 (1992). 
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were a compendium of evidentiary conclusions in various voting-rights cases that 
could not offer a guiding rationale as to why they were included in some cases but 
not in others or how a relative finding that some but not all factors were found would 
actually translate into a determination of liability. After Gingles, these factors largely 
receded from judicial inquiry, and Section 2 litigation took the form of a statistical 
battle over evidence of voting alignments along racial lines and the capacity of 
single-member districts to provide an opportunity for minority electoral success. 
As voter access has returned to the forefront, so too have the older roots of voting- 
rights law. Particularly in cases that invoke the Voting Rights Act, courts have largely 
spurned the post-Gingles analysis on polarized voting and returned voting-rights law 
to its original emphasis on historic disadvantage.81 For instance, although the Fifth 
Circuit in Veasey v. Abbott acknowledged that Shelby County had prioritized the 
consideration of contemporaneous over past discrimination, it devoted a significant 
portion of its discriminatory-effect discussion to an explication of the “social and 
historical conditions” disadvantaging the minority group in question.82 Similarly, in 
Ohio State Conference of NAACP v. Husted, the Sixth Circuit considered the historic 
as opposed to present voting factors to be “particularly relevant” to a vote-denial 
claim because of these factors’ focus on historical or current patterns of discrimina-
tion as inhibiting the minority’s ability to participate effectively in the political pro-
cess.83 Even in more classic vote-dilution cases, courts are increasingly willing to 
credit evidence of disregard as a leading factor in a fashion not anticipated by 
Gingles. Thus, two Eighth Circuit cases dealing with dilution of Native American 
votes also highlighted longstanding discrimination against this minority group. The 
court in Bone Shirt acknowledged the argument that the reservation system may 
make Native Americans more involved in tribal matters than state politics but de-
clared that “[t]he record is clear that South Dakota’s history of discrimination against 
Native-Americans has limited their ability to succeed in the state political process.”84 
And the opening section of Cottier framed the City of Martin as a recent—not merely 
historical—site of racial tensions between Native Americans and whites.85  
                                                                                                                 
 
 81. See One Wis. Inst., 2016 WL 4059222, at *50 (“[P]laintiffs’ evidence about 
Wisconsin's history of discrimination and about the effects of past discrimination that minority 
groups suffer is relevant to their Voting Rights Act claims.”).  
 82. Veasey v. Abbott, 796 F.3d 487, 509–11 (5th Cir. 2015), aff’d en banc, 830 F.3d 216 
(5th Cir. 2016) (en banc).  The en banc decision reflects the same focus.  See Veasey v. Abbott, 
830 F.3d 216, 256–62 (5th Cir. 2016) (en banc). 
 83. 768 F.3d 524, 555, 557 (6th Cir. 2014) (“[T]he burdens SB 238 and Directive 2014–
17 place on African American voters are in part caused by or linked to ‘social and historical 
conditions’ that have produced or currently produce discrimination against African Americans 
in Ohio.”), vacated, No. 14-3877, 2014 WL 10384647 (6th Cir. Oct. 1, 2014). The court re-
ferred to these as the first, third, fifth, and ninth Gingles factors. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 
U.S. 30, 36–37 (1986) (listing the circumstances that may be probative of a Section 2 viola-
tion); see also Ohio Org. Collaborative v. Husted, No. 2:15-cv-1802, 2016 WL 3248030, at 
*44 (S.D. Ohio May 24, 2016) (“[T]he [c]ourt agrees with the reasoning in [Husted I] and 
[Husted II] and concludes that S.B. 238 interacts with the historical and social conditions fac-
ing African Americans in Ohio to reduce their opportunity to participate in Ohio’s political 
process relative to other groups of voters . . . .”). 
 84. Bone Shirt v. Hazeltine, 461 F.3d 1011, 1022 (8th Cir. 2006). 
 85. Cottier v. City of Martin, 445 F.3d 1113, 1115 (8th Cir. 2006), vacated, 604 F.3d 553 
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IV. THE MISSING PIECE 
If we return to the formulation of Professor Bork, there remains a missing 
conceptual framework for the development of a coherent rule of reason in voting- 
rights law. The issue in all of the recent voting-eligibility cases ultimately turns on 
the problem of manipulation of voting rules by political insiders seeking to control 
the outcome of subsequent elections. The harm to be avoided, in the classic 
Blackstonian sense of constructing a rule of legal interpretation,86 is the capacity for 
ends-oriented manipulations of the rules by those entrusted with administration of 
the electoral system. In today’s world of hyperpartisanship, that harm is unfortu-
nately driven overwhelmingly by partisan considerations and not by more classic 
sources of exclusion, such as race or sex.  
For voting-rights law, however, assessing improper partisan motivation has 
proved the third rail of electoral challenges.87 Whether in the indirect context of chal-
lenges to multimember districting in jurisdictions with contested party challenges,88 
or in the direct context of challenges to partisan gerrymandering,89 courts have 
steered clear of doctrinal engagements with the question of excessive partisanship.90 
In the current environment, this lends an odd quality to a judicial inquiry that looks 
to the effects of partisan desires to curtail voter access to the electoral process but 
leaves an unspoken void around the operational motivation for the challenged altera-
tion of eligibility and voting rules.  
No doubt, part of the reason for judicial reluctance to engage improper partisan 
motivation is concern that, once engaged, doctrinal condemnations of partisan 
considerations admit of no readily discernible stopping point. There is no natural 
prescription against the presence of partisanship in politics, unlike the formal rejec-
tion of race or wealth as a driving consideration in voter eligibility. Partisans are by 
                                                                                                                 
 
(8th Cir. 2010) (en banc). 
 86. This idea was classically formulated as the mischief rule, a canon of construction 
instructing the judiciary to “make such . . . construction as shall suppress the mischief, and 
advance the remedy.” Heydon’s Case (1584) 76 Eng. Rep. 637, 638; 3 Co. Rep. 7 a, 7 b. As 
Blackstone interpreted this rule in the statutory context, the best mode of discerning purpose 
is “by considering the reason and spirit of it . . . . For when this reason ceases, the law itself 
ought likewise to cease with it.” 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *61 (emphasis in 
original).  
 87. See Issacharoff, Ballot Bedlam, supra note 2, at 1396–1400 (describing how “the 
overlay between partisan considerations and traditional civil-rights protections has con-
founded attempts to regulate improper behavior through a simple discrimination model”). 
 88. See Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 149–53 (1971) (characterizing the denial of 
a dedicated representative to a concentrated black community within a multimember district 
as “a function of losing elections” and not of impermissible discrimination). 
 89. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 281 (2004) (plurality opinion) (denying partisan-
gerrymandering claim because of the absence of “judicially discernible and manageable stand-
ards for adjudicating” such claims). 
 90. But see N.C. State Conference of the NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204, 214 (4th 
Cir. July 29, 2016) (“Using race as a proxy for party may be an effective way to win an elec-
tion. But intentionally targeting a particular race’s access to the franchise because its members 
vote for a particular party, in a predictable manner, constitutes discriminatory purpose.”). 
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their nature partisan. The structural allocation of authority over election administra-
tion is a uniquely American disability in the political arena. The Venice Commission 
of the Council of Europe, for example, sets out as a categorical rule of election 
administration in its guidelines on best electoral practices, that an “impartial body 
must be in charge of applying electoral law.”91 But once administration becomes 
intertwined with partisan politics, courts have a difficult time saying at what point 
partisanship has excessively infected the decision-making process. 
Here too there is an odd parallel to yet another area of antitrust law that implicates 
motive: predatory pricing. As Judge Easterbrook has observed, “You cannot be a 
sensible business executive without understanding the link among prices, your firm’s 
success, and other firms’ distress. If courts use the vigorous, nasty pursuit of sales as 
evidence of a forbidden ‘intent’, they run the risk of penalizing the motive forces of 
competition.”92 The tiger rarely changes its stripes, and the “drive to succeed lies at 
the core of a rivalrous economy. Firms need not like their competitors; they need not 
cheer them on to success; a desire to extinguish one's rivals is entirely consistent 
with, often is the motive behind, competition.”93 A focus on motive risks mistaking 
the spirit of the enterprise for the evil to be averted. Per Judge Posner,  
Most businessmen don't like their competitors, or for that matter compe-
tition. They want to make as much money as possible and getting a mo-
nopoly is one way of making a lot of money. That is fine, however, so 
long as they do not use methods calculated to make consumers worse off 
in the long run.94 
At bottom, the issue of partisan motive pushes courts to the heart of the peculiar 
practice of leaving the umpiring to the players. Uniquely among democracies, the 
United States staffs its election administration by officials either selected in partisan 
elections or selected by those elected to office in partisan contests. It would be an 
odd legal constraint to award state authority over elections as part of the spoils of 
electoral success, then to demand that the duties discharged by that office be free of 
any partisan taint. Without a bedrock principle of administrative independence from 
politics for the electoral process overall, courts are left in the bizarre world of trying 
to define the consequences of too much partisanship without an ability to condemn 
partisanship as such. This is not a defense of partisan administration of the electoral 
process, but a recognition of an unfortunate real-world constraint on what judges can 
do.95 
The Supreme Court’s one recent engagement with voter access did nothing to help 
guide the judicial inquiry. In Crawford, the Supreme Court allowed that unalloyed 
                                                                                                                 
 
 91. EUROPEAN COMM’N FOR DEMOCRACY THROUGH LAW, CODE OF GOOD PRACTICE IN 
ELECTORAL MATTERS: GUIDELINES AND EXPLANATORY REPORT 15 (2003). 
 92. A.A. Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Rose Acre Farms, Inc., 881 F.2d 1396, 1401–02 (7th Cir. 
1989). 
 93. Id. at 1402. 
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unique American practice, see Samuel Issacharoff, Gerrymandering and Political Cartels, 116 
HARV. L. REV. 593 (2002). 
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partisanship could condemn state action: “If [partisan] considerations had provided 
the only justification for a photo identification requirement, we may also assume that 
[such a law] would suffer the same fate as the poll tax at issue in Harper [v. Virginia 
Board of Elections].”96 Such an administrative rule that could be explained in purely 
partisan terms would be an odd bird, particularly once the Court announced that this 
would be per se grounds for unconstitutionality. More significantly, the Court re-
jected the claim that partisan motivations of at least some of the proponents of an 
Indiana voter-identification law could suffice to condemn an act that had at least 
some valid, neutral justifications. As expressed by Justice Stevens,  
[I]f a nondiscriminatory law is supported by valid neutral justifications, 
those justifications should not be disregarded simply because partisan 
interests may have provided one motivation for the votes of individual 
legislators. The state interests identified as justifications for [the act] are 
both neutral and sufficiently strong to require us to reject petitioners’ fa-
cial attack on the statute. The application of the statute to the vast major-
ity of Indiana voters is amply justified by the valid interest in protecting 
“the integrity and reliability of the electoral process.”97 
Both the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits have followed suit by explicitly 
discounting a consideration of partisanship and referencing the Crawford dicta that 
a nondiscriminatory law with at least some valid, neutral justifications cannot be im-
pugned or disregarded simply because some of its proponents were motivated in part 
by partisan concerns.98 The Sixth Circuit in Obama for America acknowledged that 
manipulation of voting rules could allow partisan legislatures to “give extra early 
voting time to groups that traditionally support the party in power and impose 
corresponding burdens on the other party's core constituents.”99 Conspicuously, 
however, this did not fit into the court’s reasoning or holding.  
Following Professor Bork’s lead in antitrust, the reason for the tremendous 
influence of Chicago-inspired antitrust theory was that it filled the missing void as 
to the object of judicial review under either rule of reason or more formal per se law. 
Bork and many others both in the academy and in the Justice Department took on the 
small-is-better line of reasoning from Brandeis through Douglas with a simple theory 
based upon consumer welfare as the governing objective in competition law. All the 
balancing in the world cannot yield a result if one cannot specify the objective of the 
balancing test. Whatever the imprecisions and uncertainties in the consumer welfare 
paradigm in antitrust law, it has the great virtue of providing a metric that tied the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 96. Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 203 (2008) (citing Harper v. 
Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966)). 
  97. Id. at 204 (quoting Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 n.9 (1983)). But see 
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objective of antitrust law to the aims of the collusive behavior it was trying to pro-
scribe. An agreement in restraint of competition both had the aim of obtaining 
monopoly rents from the consuming public and could be measured by the 
corresponding diminution of consumer welfare. On this very simple take, consumer 
welfare integrated the harm and the prohibited objectives doctrinally. 
By contrast, the new voting-rights rule of reason awaits its integrative doctrinal 
logic in articulating a theme of voter welfare. Starting from the proposition that the 
new voting cases stem from a misuse of partisan authority over the administration of 
elections, the question becomes whether a contextual burden-shifting approach can 
overcome an inquiry that directs court focus away from the partisan motivations for 
the challenged ballot restrictions. In effect, courts are searching for the consequences 
of partisan excess without being able to ferret out the root cause. At some point the 
oncologist needs to look for the cancerous tumor itself, not simply for the metastatic 
manifestations.  
CONCLUSION 
Generalizing just a bit, the broader question concerns the prospects of a second-
order regulatory regime that seeks to cabin excess without addressing the core im-
proper activity. Two possible analogies emerge from antitrust law.  
From its inception, the rule of reason had an ad hoc quality to its assessments of 
any particular market activity. But its imprecision allowed penetration by the 
comprehensive account offered by the consumer-welfare approach. Perhaps the 
seeds of a new approach may be present when Judge Posner speaks of the need for 
the law to be vigilant against efforts “to discourage voting by persons likely to vote 
against the party responsible for imposing burdens.”100 We may term this a “voter 
welfare” approach in which the democratic welfare of the voters is measured by their 
collective ability to “throw the rascals out.” 101 Such a voter-welfare approach would 
resonate in democratic theory with ample support from the Schumpeterian idea that 
democracy rests on political elites having to compete for popular support and thereby 
having an incentive to engage, educate, and mobilize the generally passive bulk of 
the population. We can further embellish the market analogy to antitrust by speaking 
of political competition as reducing the agency costs associated with unaccountable 
political leaders, the political order’s equivalent of monopoly rents.  
But what if past proves to be prologue and courts continue to shy away from any 
direct engagement with the misuse of partisan political power? Here there is perhaps 
an alternative lesson from antitrust law. For decades, regulators and courts have been 
able to thwart mergers that are deemed to overly concentrate a particular market. 
Without engaging in debates over the robustness of the Herfindahl-Hirschman index 
(HHI) and the arcana of antitrust law, there are workable metrics to define when a 
competitive equilibrium is under threat.102 For all its apparent precision, the HHI’s 
                                                                                                                 
 
 100. Frank v. Walker, 773 F.3d 783, 796 (7th Cir. 2014) (Posner, J., dissenting from denial 
of rehearing en banc). 
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10,000-point scale (seemingly so much more scientific than a mere A–F course grad-
ing curve) cannot answer a simple question about the optimal number of firms in the 
market. It simply quantifies the intuition that under certain circumstances there is too 
much concentration, defined by the Department of Justice as a score over 2500.103 
Where the HHI score is lower, it provides a safe harbor in which concerns of exces-
sive diminution of competition are allayed. Even without a clear conception of the 
ultimate goal, the HHI provides a serviceable tool for helping us know when we see 
it. One need not define the platonic ideal of how many firms are necessary to create 
a perfectly competitive market in order to identify when too few firms pose a threat 
to market competition. 
We should never underestimate the ability of the law to just muddle through. 
Ultimately, any rule of reason is just an injunction to courts to do the best they can. 
Unspecified problems, imprecise commands, yet an equitable faith that somehow 
wrongs may be righted. 
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